The US Army War College Quarterly: Parameters
Volume 34
Number 3 Parameters Autumn 2004

Article 12

8-1-2004

Mapping the Route of Leadership Education: Caution Ahead
George Reed
Craig Bullis
Ruth Collins
Christopher Paparone

Follow this and additional works at: https://press.armywarcollege.edu/parameters

Recommended Citation
George Reed, Craig Bullis, Ruth Collins & Christopher Paparone, "Mapping the Route of Leadership
Education: Caution Ahead," Parameters 34, no. 3 (2004), doi:10.55540/0031-1723.2220.

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by USAWC Press. It has been accepted for inclusion in The
US Army War College Quarterly: Parameters by an authorized editor of USAWC Press.

Mapping the Route of
Leadership Education:
Caution Ahead
GEORGE REED, CRAIG BULLIS,
RUTH COLLINS, and CHRISTOPHER PAPARONE

“Educational experts from the systems analyst school seek to impose
research-based techniques on teachers in the place of the knowledge of
teaching derived from experience, apprenticeship, and study of educational
purpose. Such context-stripped research-based knowledge cannot
substitute for professional knowledge.”
1
— Joe L. Kincheloe

O

ne of the hardest things for a successful organization to do is question
the assumptions on which its success is attributed. The US military
reached its preeminence on the battlefield, in part, due to a highly systematic
approach to training and leadership development. Much of the program planning and curriculum in our system of professional military training and education was developed through a systems analysis approach, best illustrated in
the Army’s use of detailed tasks, conditions, and standards. Systematic training models drive the design, resourcing, execution, and assessment phases of
a variety of schools and courses in a multitude of settings and specialties. It is
second nature for many in the military to default to these technically rational
processes, not only for training in basic soldier skills, but for leader education
as well. The personality types of our leaders combine with a planning culture
that can result in approaches to leader development more applicable for the
industrial age than the information age.
At the center of defense transformation is the issue of what will
make 21st-century military operations successful. Everything is on the table,
from force management, weapons platforms, institutional processes, man-
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ning policies, and organizational culture, to educational philosophies and
practices used in professional military education. It is in the spirit of engaging
in and expanding the discourse on the important subject of leadership education that we wrote this article.
One ongoing debate relates to a “Joint Competencies Leader Development Framework” proposed by the Joint Forces Command (JFCOM) J9
Joint Experimentation Directorate.2 The initiative is a commendable effort to
improve joint education toward the goal of improved joint operations. When J9
developed the proposal, a number of service entities were already in the process of devising leader competency lists, including the Air Force, Army Research Institute, and Army Command and General Staff College. Contractors
at Fort Leavenworth also were instrumental in developing a competency map
that guided the redesign of Army intermediate-level education. Accordingly,
competency mapping had to appear promising to JFCOM. Competency-based
program planning is attractive to a military community that holds concrete, rational processes in high esteem.
Reviewing the J9 proposal required us to step back and review educational strategies for developing leaders, particularly strategic leaders who
guide the course of the military profession. Senior service colleges are charged
with educating many of the nation’s future strategic leaders. The J9 initiative is
an important one because it represents an effort to think seriously about elements of abstract knowledge that are characteristic of the warfighting profession and to ensure that such knowledge is passed to practicing members via an
admittedly disparate system of schools and courses. This is no small task. The
results of the proposal have implications for every school in the professional
military education system involved in leadership development. At stake in this
initiative is the process by which the joint community identifies areas for inclusion in the curricula of our service and joint schools and then holds them accountable via the program for the accreditation of joint education.
At the heart of any profession is a body of expertise and abstract
knowledge that its members are expected to apply within its granted jurisdiction. Those who learn and employ that knowledge in unique contexts are
rightly described as professionals; in them lies the heart and soul of the profes-
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sion. Abstract professional knowledge, however, can be frustratingly hard to
define. It extends beyond discrete tasks to include the synthesis of experience
and intuition. It involves elements of art as well as science. Transferring abstract knowledge through teaching has similar characteristics. Teaching in the
professional military education system involves more than delivering content.
Good teaching is an art form in its own right. A good teacher can overcome a
poor curriculum, while a great curriculum will not substitute for a poor teacher.
Industrial-age organizations seek routine and habit achieved through standardized procedures. Complex tasks are broken into simple steps that are assigned
to organizational positions to ensure that employees are both interchangeable
and easily replaced. Bureaucratic hierarchies tend to value quantifiable assessment of specific aspects of complex managerial tasks.
Also at stake is the issue of who drives this leadership development
process, a process we believe is key to the future of the military profession. We
must ask whether outsourcing the development of a list of competencies that
then drives the curricula of professional military schools is the wisest course. It
is appropriate to question just how much we should rely on individuals outside
the profession to chart and transfer the military’s professional knowledge.
As with most goals in complex systems, there are multiple ways of
achieving them. There are aspects of the systems analysis approach to education that are useful. There is nothing inherently harmful in developing competency lists, provided they are kept general in nature and viewed with the
appropriate level of circumspection. We are concerned, however, that this approach lacks the complex contextual and relational elements that combine to
determine leadership effectiveness or failure. When carried to the extent of
detailed crosswalks to learning objectives, competency mapping represents
an over-engineered approach to leadership development and education that
is more bureaucratic than professional. This article critically examines the
control-oriented approach to leadership development exemplified in the use
of list-based techniques such as competency mapping. We suggest an alternative approach that is more adaptive to the rapidly changing environment and
more appropriate for the military profession.

Explanation of Competency Mapping
Competency maps take on a wide variety of forms. While there is no
one correct way of depicting them, they can generally be described as a formal, top-down effort to identify, list, label, track, and measure competency
descriptors. The competencies might be called knowledge areas, skills, attributes, attitudes, components, tasks, traits, or simply competencies. Once
identified, numbered, and listed, they are usually broken down into subcomponents, which are also numbered, so they might be associated with the
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“The education of strategic leaders is not an
endeavor suited to an assembly-line approach.”

broader competency area or cluster of competencies. The mapping aspect comes into play when the competency areas are mapped to training and educational objectives and events, and then ultimately to desired leadership behaviors. Mapping models appear very comprehensive (or at least impressive due
to their voluminous nature) due to the multiple linkages depicted in the map.
They might be displayed in elaborate hierarchical diagrams or multiple foldouts or some other fashion designed by the administrators of the process.
With their elaborate tracking mechanisms, the models also promise horizontal and vertical integration in the development of leadership competencies
throughout organizational levels and educational institutions. Competency
mapping is particularly appealing to analytically oriented decisionmakers.
Advocates for competency mapping assert that one can develop a
metric to measure the relative success of an individual competency that will
predict success in associated leadership behaviors. If the performance behaviors are successfully captured and the feedback metrics are established for the
competencies on the list, then gaps in leader development can be detected by
recording, monitoring, and remediating individual progress against the list.
Advocates hail elaborate computer-based models of competency mapping, arguing that an instructor, superior, mentor, or individual can push a button and
see the educational opportunities available to address any particular competency. Advocates refer to competency mapping as adaptive because the list and
the educational experiences that complement the competencies can continually be revised.
Advocacy of competency mapping appears to be spreading. Its goal is
to develop a blueprint, map, or matrix of desired skills, knowledge, attributes,
and attitudes at various levels of the organization. The map is then used to
channel recruiting, hiring, and training decisions. Competency mapping has
gained a following in the human resources community and spawned a cottage
industry of business consultants and vendors who profess expertise in its application. It is often advertised as a means to save time and resources in the hiring
of new personnel and to document the occupational training needs of employees. While competency mapping is purported to be in the spirit of the information age, it is reminiscent of industrial-age concepts derived from Taylorism
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and Fordism. Frederick Taylor, the early 20th-century father of “scientific
management,” spawned time and motion studies of work to construct the standardization of tasks. Henry Ford capitalized on Taylor’s theories and created a
workforce trained and organized around the standardization of worker tasks on
the assembly line. But the education of strategic leaders is not an endeavor
suited to an assembly-line approach.

Critique of the Mapping Approach to Leadership Education
At the heart of list-based approaches like competency mapping is an
assumption that certain attributes such as motives, values, and skills can be
identified and reproduced through training and education, resulting in effectively led organizations. The lineage of this approach lies in trait theories of
leadership that coincided with Taylorism. Indeed, trait theory is one of the earliest frameworks for leadership study. Education scholars Joe F. Donaldson
and Paul Jay Edelson have noted that “trait theory was developed in the first
part of the twentieth century and took a psychological approach to specifying
the personality traits of effective leaders. Although research has shown no relationship between individual traits and effectiveness, this approach still finds
modern expression.”3
The trait approach has largely been supplanted by more sophisticated frameworks, yet leader competency mapping is proof positive that despite its dubious foundation the approach endures. Noted leadership author
and scholar Gary Yukl has observed:
Early leadership theories attributed managerial success to extraordinary abilities such as tireless energy, penetrating intuition, uncanny foresight, and irresistible persuasive powers. Hundreds of studies were conducted during the
1930s and 1940s to discover these elusive qualities, but this massive research
effort failed to find any traits that would guarantee leadership success. One reason for the failure was a lack of attention to intervening variables in the causal
chain that could explain how traits could affect a delayed outcome such as
group performance or leader advancement.4

Peter Northouse, author of Leadership: Theory and Practice noted
the resurgence of a comprehensive skills-based model of leadership characterized by a map for how to reach effective leadership in organizations.5 He suggested that the identification of specific skills which can be enhanced by
training has an intuitive appeal: “When leadership is framed as a set of skills, it
becomes a process that people can study and practice to become better at their
jobs.”6 This model provides a ready hook on which training and educational institutions can hang their curricula. It also results in an expansive list of desired
skills. Northouse’s criticism of this approach includes the observation that the
50
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skills model of leadership has weak predictive value: “It does not explain specifically how variations in social judgment skills and problem-solving affect
performance.”7 He also suggests that although the skills-based approach
claims not to be a trait model, it includes individual attributes that look a great
deal like traits.
When attempting to influence the large and dispersed system of professional military training and education institutions, there is a powerful tendency to seek solutions that are definitive, prescriptive, and complete. Such
solutions seek integration and promise measurement of performance in the
best tradition of systems analysis. It is understandable why the military’s proposed approach to leadership includes competency mapping. It reveals a penchant for an unambiguous list that is both definable and measurable. It
suggests that the paradigm of technical rationality—with its emphasis on logical reasoning, science, and empirical method—is in operation. It seeks prediction, standards, and control of the training and educational process.
The act of leadership is also an exercise of moral reasoning. In their
book Unmasking Administrative Evil, Guy Adams and Danny Balfour caution against elevating the scientific-analytical mindset above all other forms
of rationality. While the rise of “technical rationality led inexorably to specialized, expert knowledge, the very life blood of the professional,” it also
“spawned unintended consequences in the areas of morals and ethics as the
science-based technical rationality undermined normative judgments and
relegated ethical considerations to afterthoughts.”8 Distinguished scholar
Ronald Heifetz developed a definition of leadership that takes values into account. He maintains that we should look at leadership as more than a means to
organizational effectiveness. Effectiveness means reaching achievable decisions that implement the goals of the organization. “This definition has the
benefit of being generally applicable, but it provides no real guide to determine the nature or formation of those goals.”9 Heifetz went on to say that values such as “liberty, equality, human welfare, justice, and community” are
inculcated with good leaders.10 We affirm the necessity for infusion of these
values into the leader and from the leader into the organization, while questioning whether this can be achieved through competency mapping.
An overly detailed, list-based approach could result in professional
military education that is contrary to that which is actually needed. It could
restrict what is taught to only that which is on the list. It could become
self-perpetuating, not subject to continuous review, and therefore become detached from what is needed in the field. Such lists suggest skills that can be
mastered, anathema to the concept of lifelong learning. Finally, this form of
competency mapping encourages normative stratification between levels of
professional military education rather than the desired integration. R. L.
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“An overly detailed, list-based approach could
result in professional military education
that is contrary to that which is actually needed.”

Shaw and Dennis Perkins provide an important observation: “The ideals of
worker empowerment, reflection, process, and collaboration often conflict
with organizational norms of authoritarian management, bias towards activity and measurable performance, and competitive ‘competency traps.’”11
A competency trap “reflects the ways in which improving capabilities with one rule, technology, strategy, or practice interferes with changing
that rule, technology, strategy or practice to another that is potentially superior.”12 Defense institutions will eventually make improvements to the list,
but it would be unfortunate if those improvements were limited to the scope
and methods of competency mapping. Improvements to the competency list
will appear to signal a series of “successes,” thereby reinforcing its use and
reducing incentives to search for a better way to develop leaders. Hence, leadership development will be caught in a competency trap created by its own
learning process. In reality, the adaptation really needed is ignored because
the existing paradigm has been institutionalized to the point of being culturally embedded.13
The prevention of competency traps comes from adopting principles
associated with organizational learning. Competency traps can be explained
as “single-loop learning,” where the leaders and the organization observe the
consequences of action (e.g., experimenting with a leadership competency
map) and then ask for feedback to gain knowledge as to its effectiveness (e.g.,
whether it helped in developing leaders). The organization then adjusts its
subsequent action to avoid similar mistakes (or deviations from what an ideal
list or map should do) in the future. According to organization behaviorist
Chris Argyris of Harvard University, single-loop learning appears to solve
problems, but ignores the issue as to why the overall solution was sought in
the first place (e.g., What problem were we trying to solve when we decided
that leadership competency maps would solve it?).14 From this perspective,
competency mapping seems to be a ready-made solution that gives false clarity to the otherwise complex and often ambiguous nature of leadership.
“Double-loop learning,” on the other hand, requires a higher-order
form of awareness. It bypasses the single feedback loop of the top-down
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approach. Double-loop learning requires a multiple lens strategy that facilitates “knowledge of several different perspectives and forces the organization to clarify differences in assumptions across frameworks, rather
than implicitly assuming a given set.”15 In our current discourse, viewing
leader development from a variety of perspectives would help the continuously transforming military sustain a double-loop learning posture that
is always ready for more significant adaptation than a single perspective
would allow.16
We should be very circumspect of our ability to identify an adequate,
much less complete, list of competencies applicable to a rapidly changing operational environment. As the competencies are mapped to skills, then to behaviors, and to intermediate, enabling, and terminal learning objectives in the
training and education base, they could drive us to a place we do not want to
be. The paradox is that more is actually less. The more we try to describe and
prescribe a list of defined, specific competencies, the more we lead away
from the agile, adaptive, self-aware leader we want. The danger of prescriptive lists is that they create the impression that success can be assured by mastering specific competencies. Our colleague, Dr. Leonard Wong, is correct
when he says:
In the military’s zeal to address all aspects of systems level leadership, the lists
of strategic leader competencies are actually too comprehensive. At the individual level, it is difficult to assess one’s leadership ability when the lists suggest that a strategic leader must be, know, and do just about everything. At the
institutional level, the lack of parsimony makes it difficult to focus an institution’s attention and resources on leader development when such a broad array
of competencies is advocated.17

Even the progenitor of the skills-based approach, noted social psychologist Robert L. Katz, limited the list to three personal skills: technical,
human, and conceptual. A military study in the early 1990s developed a
model of leadership comprising five components: competencies, individual
attributes, leadership outcomes, career experiences, and environmental influences. Northouse notes that problem-solving, social judgment, and knowledge are at the heart of the skills model of leadership.18 Such broad and
ill-defined categories are not satisfying to bureaucracies seeking to eliminate
ambiguity and achieve compliance via standardization and routinization.
Yet, high-performing professions thrive within this kind of ambiguity because it allows for creativity and adaptation. Faculty members in the system
of professional military education charged with collecting and passing abstract knowledge of the profession welcome such ambiguity as an opportunity for creativity and flexibility.
Autumn 2004

53

Another concern with list-based approaches like competency mapping relates to a known deficiency of trait listing. Is there any positive attribute you would want to leave off the list? What positive attributes do you not
want leaders to have? Won’t the list change as the times change? Of course we
want military leaders to have all the virtues of the Boy Scout: be trustworthy,
loyal, helpful, and the rest. We also want them to be compassionate in some
situations and dealers of death and destruction in others. We want leaders to
be decisive, yet also contemplative. Such ambiguities and paradoxes are
rarely captured in trait lists. Nobel laureate Herbert Simon observed that
when you can identify a principle with an equally plausible and acceptable
contradictory principle without a guide to indicate which one is proper to apply in a given situation, you are dealing with proverbs.19 Proverbs almost always occur in mutually contradictive pairs and are ideal for rationalizing
action that has already taken place. As Simon noted, of course “you should
look before you leap,” but it is also true that “he who hesitates is lost.” Left
unstated is the contextual information that helps discriminate when it is appropriate to hesitate and when one should leap. Proverbs are not a basis on
which to base leadership development.
Recently, Anna Simons of the Naval Postgraduate School briefed
the results of a Department of Defense summer study titled “The Military Officer of 2030.” That study group wisely determined that outside of a short list
of universal beneficial leadership traits (e.g., responsible leaders of good
character), we simply do not know the specifics of the kind of leader we will
need in 30 years. It is unwise to attempt to predict the specific traits that will
be required, and if we had the temerity to lock onto such a list, we could do the
nation great harm if we were wrong. According to the study group, the correct
organizational response under such uncertain conditions is to build in as
much variation in skills and attributes as tolerable. The idea behind this approach is that with variation you likely will have some in the inventory with
the skills needed at any critical point in time, and this gives the organization a
population with which to adjust. If you accept the conclusion of the study
group, we might ask whether competency mapping is a legitimate means to
achieve or inhibit variation.
Our view of leadership is changing as our image of organizations
changes. In the words of a colleague, when you lead yesterday’s military, you
fight yesterday’s wars.20 We are concerned that detailed leader competency
maps composed of extensive databases and matrices rely on traditional notions of leadership appropriate for bureaucratic hierarchies and fail to capture
emerging leadership concepts suitable to a military viewed as a complex
adaptive system. We recognize that leadership in complex adaptive systems
relies on relationship-building over role-defining, loose coupling over stan54
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“The danger of prescriptive lists is that they
create the impression that success can be assured
by mastering specific competencies.”

dardization, learning over knowing, self-synchronization over command and
control, and emergent thinking over planning based on estimates.21
We have noticed among War College students, who eventually constitute the cadre of senior Army leaders, a predominant personality type that has a
penchant for details, specifics, early closure, and structure.22 In our profession
there is a clear preference for objective, concrete, and pragmatic solutions.23
We should not be surprised then that leadership competency mapping, essentially an engineering approach, appeals to our community. It is highly rational
and neat. You can easily trace up and down the matrix from competencies to
skills and behaviors and back again, and therein lies a problem: it is too neat.
We might well be better served by stating that what we really need
are leaders who are adept at learning almost anything very quickly, or skilled
at recognizing patterns and converting abstract knowledge to action appropriate for a given situation. Leaders should be values champions for organizations and must be attuned to issues of climate and culture. We also need
leaders who can communicate effectively to a wide range of audiences. They
need to inspire soldiers and also be able to address the American public and
the international community through the unblinking eye of the television
camera. We must focus on how to think and not what to think, but these fuzzy
concepts do not sell well in military culture.
As stated earlier, leadership and leader development are both art and
science. The eminent leadership scholar Bernard Bass cautions against focusing solely on quantitative approaches in leadership research and makes an important observation about the nature of leadership in general:
Often, qualitative research can deal better with the art and craft of leadership
than can the more objective quantitative analysis. There is much in leadership
that is difficult or impossible to put into a test tube. Nevertheless, there is much
regularity in this art that can be made understandable by detecting and describing the patterns that appear.24

We are concerned that competency mapping is a pseudo-science that
has similarities to the test-tube approach that Bass counsels against. We also
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must remember that most of our professional military education process is
oriented on adult learners. Education scholar Raymond Noe observed that a
great deal of contemporary educational theory and practice is oriented to children and youth, where the instructor makes decisions about learning content
and the students are passive receptors with few experiences to contribute.25
Adults have a need to be self-directed, are motivated when they understand
the need for such learning, and prefer a work-related and problem-solving
orientation.26 With limited time for education in our system of schools and
courses, we should ensure that extensive top-down competency lists do not
fill the curriculum to the extent that they drive out self-directed and other
learning opportunities.
Even though well-defined competency maps initially seem innovative, we risk the inevitable “new idea lifecycle” problem that occurs when the
list becomes tied with bureaucratic red tape. While the map could be updated
periodically with fresh interpretations of events and feedback on current
leadership and organizational shortcomings, we expect the inevitable emergence of an institutionalized process that could inhibit necessary changes.
That is, we fear the competency mapping process will take on a life of its own,
at the expense of opportunity lost for truly improving joint military education, as discussed below.

An Alternative Collaborative
Leadership Development Framework
There are alternative paradigms (including that of the interpretivist)
which emphasize the more humanist themes in use by the organization, the
underlying cultural values and beliefs in operation, and the relationship between symbolism and action. Adherents to this perspective are less concerned with identifying specific leadership variables leading to effectiveness
and efficiency and note that all social science measurement is fallible, if not
suspect. Given the existence of more subjective perspectives, we suggest that
no single epistemological approach be privileged. We advocate the use of a
double-loop learning approach and the application of multiple perspectives
to leadership study and curriculum development.
The effort currently being invested into detailed competency lists
and maps would be better placed in several specific directions: (1) improving the means by which we assess the needs of the joint profession and specifically the means by which we identify joint warfighting competencies
requiring improvement; (2) providing information gained from that assessment to those responsible for joint training and education; (3) facilitating a
network by which the myriad institutions involved in professional military
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education can collaborate, exchange information, and share professional expertise; and (4) revising leadership development frameworks to include multiple perspectives.
In the first three of these recommendations lies an alternative model
for curriculum development, while the fourth is an outcome. We caution
against collecting an inexhaustible and dubious list of traits and skills of the
ideal joint leader and then mandating it to the system of professional military
education. Instead, we should take careful stock of our current state against
the backdrop of the contemporary operational environment. By examining
the current state against near-term needs, the gap between the existing and the
desired can be determined. The desire to narrow the gap can then drive the
system of professional military education.
We are confident the institutions that make up the system of professional military education are capable of adjusting to address emerging needs.
The process can be speeded by a vibrant network that encompasses the various schools and courses in the system. In the case of our own institution, the
US Army War College conducts a variety of surveys of stakeholders and
graduates, and reviews many reports and studies, as part of the curriculum development process. However, there is no comprehensive means to identify
joint leadership development needs that extend across institutional boundaries. There is no shortage of good ideas about where the college should focus
its efforts, but it is not always clear that those ideas relate to the real needs
across the field. An alternative curriculum development approach that would
do this for the joint community can be modeled as in Figure 1.
Field observation,
studies, research,
lessons learned

Joint learning
areas stipulated
Joint
leadership
assessment

Faculties
develop
and deliver
curriculum

Network of
PME schools
and courses

Program for
Accreditation of Joint
Education; assessment
of curriculum delivery

Figure 1. Proposed Adaptive Model of Curriculum Development.
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We should not underestimate the scope of an endeavor that would result in creation and dissemination of the joint leadership assessment. What
we suggest is a comprehensive assessment of the state of joint leadership using the best tools and minds available for the effort. Such collaborative assessments are expensive and manpower-intensive, so much so that they are
not often replicated on a frequent basis. In order to remain relevant to a rapidly changing environment, we recommend that the assessment be conducted
on an almost continuous basis. Optimally the assessment would coincide
with the annual curriculum development processes of the institutions engaged in joint professional military education. With visibility of the assessment results, the faculty could begin to address the issues as they develop
their approach to the next academic year.
The joint warfighting leadership assessment results would provide a
substantive basis for continual reframing of professional military education.
As an example, if it were determined that officers of a particular service have
difficulty reacting to unplanned events and developing creative solutions, then
curricular emphasis could be shifted from operational planning to adaptability
and creativity. If senior leaders are perceived to lack media skills, then additional public speaking and media opportunities could be arranged in the appropriate schools and courses. Such modifications need not necessitate wholesale
institutional change and they need not await the revision of a competencies list.
Changes conducted on a continual basis can result in transformative shifts over
time. This process encourages action at the lowest level to adjust to emerging
needs. Such an active and continual process makes a competency list outdated
if not superfluous upon publication.
A process of continual examination and change is preferable to a
prescribed list of tasks that takes years to develop. Under the existing process
that relies on an entity called the Military Education Coordinating Council, it
can literally take years to change the joint learning areas mandated in Joint
Chiefs of Staff Instruction 1800.01, the Officer Professional Military Education Policy. We note that the current list of joint learning areas includes no emphasis on the subject of leadership. The process for accreditation of joint
education that is used to “grade the paper” of the various schools involved
in joint military education includes an on-site review conducted every five
years. Despite the long timelines involved in this process, we do not recommend its abolishment. Instead we suggest that it be supplemented with a
timely joint leader assessment which the faculty can use as a basis for lesson
planning. The question for the accreditation team then would be less dependent on whether the school addressed the items on the list, and more on whether
they adapted their curriculum to address the items identified in the annual
joint leader assessment.
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We further recommend establishment of a network so those involved in professional military education can collaborate, exchange information, and share professional expertise across institutional boundaries.
This could be accomplished through symposia, conferences, communities
of practice, faculty exchange programs, and faculty development initiatives. When these events and resources are targeted to addressing areas for
leadership improvement, the responsiveness of the educational system will
dramatically increase. Imagine giving students at one senior service college the opportunity to enroll in electives taught at another, or broadcasting an address by the Secretary of Defense held at one college to the others.
Outside of some notable service-sponsored initiatives such as the annual
Teaching Grand Strategy Conference,27 there are few mechanisms for sharing pedagogical techniques and resources among faculty members. There
are significant advantages to a networked approach to leadership education.
Our proposal would lead to an agile, flexible system of professional military
education that could adapt to emerging needs and facilitate exchanges of
ideas through dialogue.

Conclusion
Some aspects of list-based approaches exemplified by leader competency mapping are appealing, and there are strong cultural drivers and favored paradigms that help explain their dominant role as a tool for curriculum
development. However, we assert that the approach contains fundamental
flaws to the extent that it should not be relied upon as the preferred means of
driving leadership education, especially that of strategic leaders. In “Rethinking Leadership Competencies,” Jay Conger and Douglas Ready advise
us to “become far more sensitive to their shortcomings.”28 They continue:
“They are not flawless tools. Their tendency to become complicated rather
than simplified, to portray ideals of leadership rather than realities, and to focus on today’s rather than tomorrow’s competencies all seriously work to undermine their benefits.”29
We recommend instead an organizational learning-based process
enabled by vastly expanded assessment and educational network components. Our recommended framework uses context-relevant study to justify
continuous curriculum adjustment facilitated by a network of the various elements of the professional military education system. We further advocate using this network to improve leadership education and curriculum development. A networked approach to joint leadership development can lead to multiple perspectives of leadership more appropriate to a rapidly changing environment and one more worthy of the military profession.
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